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Abstract
Human societies exhibit many examples of nontrivial collective behaviour generated by the inter-
action of a large number of individuals. To characterize these emergent phenomena and understand
their origin it is crucial to discover regularities in the macroscopic patterns of data describing col-
lective social phenomena. Elections are a prominent example of collective social phenomenon, and
a quantitative statistical analysis has begun. Here we show that, in proportional elections, the
distribution of the number of votes received by candidates is universal, i.e. it is the same function
in different countries and years, when the number of votes is rescaled according to the strength
of the party each candidate belongs to. A simple dynamical model for the behaviour of voters,
based on the spreading of word of mouth, reproduces well the universal distribution. This finding
reveals the existence in the voting process of a general underlying dynamics that does not depend
on the specific historical, political and/or economical context where voters operate. This suggests
that the collective features of phenomena emerging from the opinions of large groups of interact-
ing individuals (fads, rumours, consumer behaviour) can be understood quantitatively in terms of
simple agent-based models.
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Many social nontrivial phenomena emerge spontaneously out of the mutual influence of
a large number of individuals [1, 2, 3, 4], similarly to large-scale thermodynamic behaviour
resulting from the interaction of a huge number of atoms or molecules. However, human
interactions are neither purely mechanical nor reproducible, both typical requirements for
a physical description of a process. Nevertheless the collective behaviour of large groups of
individuals may be independent from the details of social interactions and individual psy-
chological attributes and be instead the consequence of generic properties of the elementary
interactions, allowing for a simple ’statistical physics’ modeling.
In this spirit, microscopic models have been recently proposed to account for collective
social phenomena, like the formation of consensus on a specific topic [5, 6], the creation of
common cultural traits and their dissemination [7], the origin and evolution of language [8, 9],
etc. While models are studied quantitatively in great detail, the comparison with real-world
social phenomena is too often merely qualitative and on this account it is not possible to
make a real discrimination between competing models. This in turn limits their predictive
power, making it unclear if there is at all a gain in the understanding of social dynamics
from this statistical approach.
Elections are an ideal playground for a quantitative validation of the approach inspired
by physics. They constitute a precise global measurement of the state of the opinions of
the electorate. A large number of individuals are involved and big datasets are available for
many countries, thus allowing accurate quantitative investigations.
Attempts to analyze electoral outcomes have recently focused on the distribution of votes
collected by candidates. The histogram of the fraction ν of voters supporting a candidate
within a constituency in Brazilian parliamentary elections is well described by a 1/ν law, in
the central part of the range of the variable ν [10, 11, 12]. A successive analysis of Indian
elections [13] found a similar distribution, so one may wonder whether the distribution of
the fraction of votes ν is a universal feature. In Fig. 1 we show that this is not true. A
comparative analysis of the distributions of votes received by candidates in recent Brazil-
ian, German, French and Polish elections reveals marked differences between the various
countries.
The reason for the complete lack of universality shown in Fig. 1 lies in a conceptual
problem of the analysis performed so far. The number of votes a candidate receives is the
combination of two distinct factors: how many of the total number of electors vote for the
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candidate’s party and the personal appeal of the candidate within the restricted pool of
voters for that party. The first factor strongly depends on policy-related issues: typically
voters know the position of all parties with respect to the political issues they deem more
relevant and they select the party that best matches their personal views. The second factor
is instead practically independent from political issues. Since people voting for the same
party mostly share a common set of opinions on ethical, social and economical issues, the
selection of a specific candidate depends on a “personal” interaction between the candidate
and the voters. Typically voters know at most a few of the candidates in their party list, and
in this small subset they select the one they will support. Successful candidates are those
able to establish some form of direct or indirect contact with many potential voters during
the electoral campaign. This type of spreading dynamics is likely to give rise to universal
phenomena. The histogram of the total fraction ν of votes may conceal the actual regularities
due to the voter dynamics, as it entangles the two factors: a very popular candidate of a
small party can have the same number of votes (but for completely different reasons) of a
relatively unpopular candidate of a very large party.
In the following we focus on the second factor, how the electors of each party select
candidates in their party list. This rules out systems based on single member constituencies,
where every party/coalition presents a single candidate in each electoral district (like the
German and French elections of Fig. 1), as well as proportional elections with closed lists,
where voters are not allowed to express preferences among party candidates: the ranking of
candidates of a party is predetermined by the party itself.
The most suitable elections to investigate the elementary voter dynamics are proportional
with multiple-seat constituencies and open lists. In these elections, a certain number of seats,
typically between 10 and 30, is allocated in every constituency. Each party gets a number
ni of seats in proportion to the number of votes it has received. Voters also express their
preference among the candidates in the party list and the ni most voted candidates of party
i are elected.
We have considered three countries with such type of electoral system: Italy (until 1992),
Poland and Finland. We use publicly available [14] data sets for three elections in Italy
(1958, 1972, 1987), one in Poland (2005) and one in Finland (2003). The total number
of candidates ranges from 2, 029 for the Finnish elections in 2003 to 10, 658 for the Polish
elections in 2005.
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In order to factor out the policy-related role of the parties, we consider the distribution of
votes v for candidates in the list of a single party in a specific constituency. The histogram
is in general a function P (v,Q,N) where Q is the number of candidates present in the party
list and N is the total number of votes the list receives: N accounts for the highly variable
strength of the different parties.
We find that the distribution P (v,Q,N) is actually a function of the single variable
vQ/N , i.e.
P (v,Q,N) = F (vQ/N). (1)
Since v0 = N/Q is the average number of votes collected by a candidate in his/her list, the
ratio vQ/N = v/v0 is an index of the performance of a candidate against his/her competitors
in the same list. If v/v0 < 1, the candidate has received less votes than average, if v/v0 ≫ 1
he/she performes much better than average.
Equation 1 indicates that each election can be characterized by a single function
F (vQ/N). A comparison between the scaling functions F for all five data sets is presented
in Fig. 2 and gives an even more striking result: the scaling function F (vQ/N) is the same







with µ = −0.541, σ2 = −2µ = 1.082.
The universality of the distribution F (vQ/N) is truly remarkable. The elections con-
sidered span a period of thirty years, in which deep cultural, economic and social transfor-
mations have occurred: there is no hint of that in the data pattern. Likewise, differences
between countries as diverse as Italy, Poland and Finland do not play any role. This calls
for a modelization in terms of simple mechanisms of interaction between voters (and candi-
dates), regardless of the details of the social, cultural and economic environment.
The spreading of word of mouth is known to be a very effective vehicle of diffusion of new
products among potential buyers [15, 16]. We try to interpret the electoral results using a
simple opinion dynamics model based on word of mouth: electors that have already chosen
a candidate try to convince their peers to vote for the same candidate (Fig. 3). We start
with an electorate of N people that vote for a certain party and have to choose among Q
candidates. At the beginning, only candidates have an opinion (they vote for themselves).
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The dynamics starts with candidates trying to convince their acquaintances. Each voter that
has taken a decision will try in turn to convince k other voters, and so on. Only undecided
voters can be convinced. The process goes on until all N voters have selected a candidate.
The distribution p(k) of the number k of contacts of a voter (or of a candidate) has to be
broad, as there are very active people that try to convince as many voters as possible, as well
as less active ones, that do not feel particularly involved or motivated. We assume therefore
that p(k) is described by a power law, i.e. p(k) ∼ k−α, with α > 1. Obviously not every
discussion between pairs of voters will result in one convincing the other. We assume that
an interaction has a probability r of being successful.
The distribution P (v,Q,N), obtained via numerical simulations, exhibits the scaling
properties of the empirical distribution. In principle, for any pair (Q, N) we should get the
same curve, so we could lay it directly onto the universal curve of Fig. 2. In practice, since
the number of votes v received by each candidate cannot be smaller than 1 nor exceed the
total number N of votes of the list the candidate belongs to, the scaling variable vQ/N is
constrained in the interval [Q/N,Q]. Because of that, for a comparison with the empirical
data, it is necessary to simulate the process for all pairs of Q and N values occurring in the
real data sets, to account for possible slight boundary effects in the regions where vQ/N
takes small or large values.
In Fig. 2 we plot the distribution obtained from our model when one uses the pairs
(Q, N) occurring in the data set of the Italian elections in 1972 (using any of the other
data sets gives essentially the same curve); α = 2.45, r = 0.25. The comparison with the
empirical curves is remarkable. The shape of the distribution in general depends on the
choice of the parameters α and r. Nevertheless, F (vQ/N) is similar to the universal curve
for a wide interval of values of the model parameters. In particular, the decreasing part of
the curve appears to be a robust feature of the model, being nearly independent of r, and
varying slowly with α. Like in real elections, our simple multiplicative dynamics implies that
candidates with more personal contacts at the beginning will get more votes at the end.
We conclude that a simple opinion dynamics based on word of mouth reproduces with
great accuracy the universal distribution of votes for candidates in proportional elections.
The same type of interaction surely plays a relevant role also in the choice of the party and
in other types of elections (majority, plurality voting). In those cases, other ingredients, like
tactical voting and peer pressure, are probably needed to be taken into account. Since the
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performance of a candidate in a list has the same distribution everywhere, the index vQ/N
is an objective estimate of the popularity of a candidate, independently of the constituency
and the year of the election; this gives parties an unbiased quantitative basis to decide
internal rankings and hierarchies.
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FIG. 1: Distribution of the fraction of voters supporting candidates in elections held in various
countries. We considered the legislative elections 1998 in Brazil, as well as the elections for the
renewal of the Bundestag in Germany (2002), the Assemble´e Nationale in France (2002) and the
Sejm in Poland (2005). The 1/ν pattern, observed in the central portion of the Brazilian curve, is
not a general feature of this type of distributions.
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FIG. 2: Universality of the scaling function F (vQ/N) across different countries and years. The
lognormal fit, performed on the Polish curve, describes very well the data. The universal curve is
well reproduced by our model, where the dynamics of the voters’ opinions reflects the spreading of
the word of mouth in the party’s electorate.
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FIG. 3: Spreading of the word of mouth among voters. The candidate (right) convinces some of
his/her contacts to vote for him/her. The convinced voters become “activists” and try to convince
some of their acquaintances, and so on.
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